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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING LEGAL PROFESSION:
ETHICS UNDER THE MODEL RULES

DENNIS J. TUCHLER*

INTRODUCTION
How and why does one deal with questions of ethics1 in a course on the
law governing lawyers? Most of the discussion in the course focuses on the
applicable rules governing the conduct of lawyers. Those rules can be
criticized in terms of the harm they allow to flow from the representation of a
client, in the light of the social benefits purportedly furthered by those rules.
The student might even be asked to discuss the possibility of civil disobedience
in the interests of justice. But some of the applicable rules address the
student’s ethics directly. This is because in application the rules might be
ambiguous as to what they require or allow the lawyer to do, and because some
of the rules even give the lawyer discretion to act to the client’s disadvantage.
When ethics is discussed, it is not discussed as instruction in ethics, but rather
in terms of a student’s own sense—one already developed through
enculturation and socialization—of what a person should do under the
circumstances and how the decision about what to do is tied up with the social
circumstances in which the agent acts. This essay focuses on how to approach
the ethical questions that arise under these permissive rules. One such question
might be whether those permissive rules are actually permissive or whether
conduct to the client’s disadvantage allowed by such a rule is not in fact, under
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. My colleagues, John
Griesbach, Alan Howard, and Michael Korybut read a draft of this paper and made very helpful
comments.
1. Or “morals,” if you wish. The two terms are often used interchangeably. Among
lawyers and other regulated professionals, “ethics” is often taken to mean the positive rules
governing conduct by those professionals by virtue of their profession being state-regulated.
“Morals,” on the other hand, cover what a lawyer should do, all things considered, or how the
lawyer should live, including norms of conduct that relate to the relationship between a person
and a deity. I use the term “ethics” to refer to norms governing conduct in society. The term
might also be used to describe what a virtuous person would do under the circumstances. What a
person should do can refer to conduct relative to animals, if one includes them as proper objects
of social concern, and to conduct relative to future generations (e.g., conduct relating to the
environment and the consumption of non-renewable natural resources), depending on how one
understands what “society” includes.
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the circumstances, mandatory. Another such question might be whether the
lawyer can waive the opportunity to take advantage of the rule by agreement
with the client or otherwise simply ignore that rule’s permission.
Ethics is presented as role differentiated, rather than the ethics of the
“ordinary person.” This position is set out in Part II.A. of the essay. The
importance to the lawyer’s ethics of the duty of loyalty is set out in Part II.B.
The largest part of this essay deals with the relatively little-discussed problem
of what the lawyer does once this duty of loyalty is set aside by the applicable
rules. This part begins at Part II.C. and is developed in Part II.D.
I. THE DIFFERENCE OF LEGAL PROFESSION
The course in the profession of law is importantly different from other law
school courses taught three hours a week to second-year and third-year law
students.2 For the most part, however, that difference is not apparent. In terms
of training in legal skills, a course in the legal profession is not different from
other upper-division courses when it comes to the intellectual and rhetorical
skills that are developed.3 Legal profession can be taught profitably as a
classroom course, in a seminar, in a clinic, or in a pseudo-clinic (e.g.,
negotiation, trial practice, or client counseling in which there is no actual
client).4 As is the case in some upper-division courses, this course may require
some knowledge of material taught in courses, many of which most of the
students have not yet taken.5 It also refers to areas of knowledge to which
most of the students have not been exposed to any substantial degree.6

2. At St. Louis University, the course, called “Legal Profession,” is taken by second-year
students with only a sprinkling of third-year students.
3. It is a useful vehicle to teach the drafting and interpretation of written law, analysis and
solution of legal problems, and client counseling. The usual arguments as to the best way to get
the material to the students—Socratic dialogue, lecture, question-and-answer, the assignment of a
paper or papers, etc.—apply here as they do to any other course.
4. Or, it might be taught as part of several courses, in which the legal and ethical problems
of lawyers are raised in the context of advising clients. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 4–5 (2d ed. 1998).
5. Depending on the semester, many of the students have had or are currently taking
Business Associations, so they are somewhat conversant with the law of agency and the law of
partnerships and corporations. This is similar for a course in the law of evidence. All of the
students have had the Constitutional Law course that deals with federalism and separation of
powers, but most have not yet had much exposure to the law of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Nor have most of them had a course in securities regulation, criminal
procedure, or jurisprudence. If the course is to include discussion of problems relating to
representation of estates, corporations, or partnerships, the instructor will have to provide the
missing information by lecture or additional reading assignments.
6. These areas include: ethics, moral philosophy, or the social sciences, other than perhaps
economics. Many instructors are also not well trained in any such fields before coming to this
course.
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A course about the legal profession differs from other courses in two
important ways. First, this is a course in the rules that will be applicable to the
students themselves when (if) they begin to practice. They are encouraged to
take this course personally. Second, the course includes a substantial reference
to ethics, in part because some of the law governing the practice of law makes
room for discretion which can be exercised, at times, to the detriment of the
client!. The course is about the students themselves if they go on to practice
law.
The first difference, the course’s relevance to the student’s own future life
as a lawyer, should make the course of more than ordinary importance to the
future practicing lawyer. Because it is about the student’s own future life as a
lawyer, it should be the most important course to the student who expects to
practice law. Yet, this does not appear always to be the case. To be sure, there
is the risk of bar sanctions and loss of license for misconduct and perhaps
court-imposed sanctions, and that should get the student’s attention. But that
threat does not seem to fix the student’s mind and is softened even more by
some of the students’ experiences over the preceding summer in law offices.
As to the second difference, why ethics? The positivistic bias of most law
schools makes ethics seem to be a strange kind of thing for a lawyer to study.
There’s law and there’s morals, and while the first can be discussed and dealt
with in law school, the second is too difficult for the law student or the lawyer
to deal with. But in a course in the practice of law, students should constantly
face the question, “What should I do in this case?” That question might be
dealt with by reference to rules of law, except when the rule is unclear and
choices must be made between alternatives, or when the rule itself gives the
lawyer a chance to exercise discretion, even to the disadvantage of the client.
This referral of the student to her own present and future ethics seems to
weaken the intellectual attraction of the course for students, even if the ethics
of lawyers is an acceptable subject for study. Most of the students seem to
have already decided that “ethics” is a matter of ordinary sense. In a way, the
students’ view is justified. What students (and the rest of us) know about
proper conduct comes from a long period of socialization during which they
became acquainted with those cultural norms that have been worked out to
regulate social life. Figuring out what to do is not a matter of proceeding from
general value statements to rules of conduct to applications; it is a matter of
taking what one knows about how to act in particular cases and reasoning from
that knowledge of ordinary rules to determine what to do in this case. When I
engage students (and others) in ethical discourse, that is exactly how they think
about what one should do in particular circumstances.7 Rarely do I hear any
7. One of these circumstances is the position of the agent (e.g., lawyer) in the social system
and another is the relationship that a person in that position has with the person or persons
affected by the lawyer’s conduct. One of the things that the student should take away from this
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mention of categorical imperatives, utility or cultural values, or religious
teaching about the propriety of goals or the resolution of dispute. Rarely do I
hear a student refer to what a virtuous person would do, although there are
often vacuous references to “professionalism,” which could simply be a matter
of etiquette.8
The student’s thinking about what to do as a lawyer is made to appear to be
relatively simple by the student’s initial understanding of the lawyer’s roles in
the adversary system—defined in part by the lawyer’s duty of loyal and
enthusiastic aid to clients’ pursuit of their own ends.9 That takes care of a
great deal for the student, so long as the student’s personal interests as a future
lawyer are not involved in the discussion. The context of the adversary system
seems to simplify the lawyer’s professional life because, to the student, the
client’s interests seem always to trump. There are rules that limit the duty of
loyalty, of course, but those rules can be read in terms of the primary
importance of a lawyer’s pursuit of success for the client. For example, the
student may not help a client violate law,10 but the student already knows how
to interpret the law in a way most likely to overcome limitations on the
achievement of the client’s goals.11 Much of this verbal positioning is
reinforced by a strong desire for personal success. Hence any reading of a rule
that enhances the adversarial nature of the lawyer’s job by reducing its
complications, the more attractive that reading seems to be. The student’s
acceptance of a strong duty of loyalty to the client (as opposed to simple goal
orientation) can be tested in cases in which serving the client involves a
possible detriment to the lawyer’s own interests,12 including the concern the
course is the danger that the role-required conduct may affect the person when in another position
(e.g., parent, director, legislator) and other relationships.
8. I don’t do a great deal with “professionalism.” That is, in part, because of my doubts as
to the practical utility of the concept as it is developed. On the other hand, the instructor might
want to develop the theme of the virtuous lawyer and pose the question “How should I live?”
rather than “What should I do?” The former question is addressed to the virtuous lawyer; the
latter to the lawyer concerned with rules and principles. The usual focus of the course is on rules
and principles of right conduct, which fits into the student’s own thinking about ethics. Can one
teach virtue? One can certainly teach about it in the sense that one can ask the student what kind
of a person would do X in these circumstances, whether or not X is conduct required by the
applicable rules. For some informative material on virtue ethics in bite-sized form, see generally
HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE? ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007).
10. See id. at R. 1.2(d).
11. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995).
12. I rarely find students who (even with prompting) are taken aback by the “self defense”
rule of Model Rule 1.6(b)(2):
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: . . . to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
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student may have with the avoidance of (unnecessary or unreasonable) harm to
others.
II. ETHICS UNDER THE RULES
How should the instructor approach questions of ethics? Can the instructor
speak coherently about ethics in general or about the ethics of the ordinary
person? In general, all will likely agree that ethics includes at least a
prohibition on doing harm to others. Also, most will agree that, ordinarily, one
ought to treat all as equally entitled to concern and aid.13 Any departure from
such general norms should be justified or (at least) excused, if it is to be
accepted as the act of an ethical person. But, what of the claim by lawyers that
they must be allowed (indeed, are often required) to do things to others that
“ordinary persons” would find unethical? Doesn’t that claim mark lawyers as
unethical persons when they prefer the goals of their clients to the welfare of
others and harm others for their clients’ sakes?
A.

Ethics is Role-Differentiated

Near the beginning of the course, the lawyer’s normative universe should
be considered in the light of Professor Wasserstrom’s famous article on role
differentiation and the ethics of lawyers.14 The usual opposition suggested by
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client . . . .
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007). Additionally, very few are bothered by
the very broad reading given “reasonably necessary” under the guidance of Meyerhofer v. Empire
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974). For an analysis of the self-defense
exception, see Jennifer Cunningham, Eliminating “Backdoor” Access to Client Confidences:
Restricting the Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992
(1990).
13. The principles of “do no harm” and “treat all equally” are limited, of course, by the
problem of whether one can require heroic altruism of a person. My position in class and in
general is that one is not expected to be heroic. The second proposition—that one should treat all
persons equally—is controversial in its plain statement, e.g., in a culture that is strictly stratified
on the basis of birth or tribe, and is usually qualified by reference to “similar cases.” For an
interesting and short discussion of “equality,” see BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS
THE DEED chs. 8–9 (2005).
14. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1
(1975) (arguing that all persons are subject to the ordinary requirements of ethics unless some
differentiation is justified by the role of the agent, and that the agent claiming that differentiation
has the burden of proof with respect to the desirability of the conduct in question). Therefore,
role differentiation is really an exception to the general norms applicable to all persons.
However, it is not clear from the article what kinds of arguments would carry the burden in favor
of role differentiation. See also ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 2–8 (1980). Goldman distinguishes between strong and weak role
differentiation, associates the former with professional role differentiation (physicians and
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Professor Wasserstrom and other commentators is between what the lawyer
does and what the ordinary person should do under similar circumstances.15 I
think this approach is misleading because it is too simple; it does not take
account of the problems of persons acting in various relationships in the worka-day world.16 That is, there is no “ordinary person” acting as such in a social
system sufficiently complex to include lawyers.17 To be sure, we learn what to
do in general in generally-stated propositions; we learn about what to do in the
various occasions in which we interact with others. As we learn how to live in
society, we ingest broad concepts like “play fair,” “don’t harm,” and “treat
people equally,” but we understand them in terms of what we are doing at the
time as we are encumbered by the expectations attached to particular positions
and relationships in the social system.
A person who is a lawyer also holds other positions in the social system.
She may be a parent, a scout leader, a member of a religious organization’s
governing board, a holder of political office, a business partner, a teacher, etc.
In each such position, she has many different relationships with others in the
social system, to each of which is attached certain expectations on both sides
of that relationship. So, a parent has a particular relationship with each child,
with a spouse, with the children’s teachers, and with others who somehow are
related to the child. A law professor has a role with respect to each student,
with respect to colleagues, administrators, perhaps donors, and faculty from

lawyers), and asserts and argues that strong role differentiation must be justified by showing that
it is: (a) “necessary to the fulfillment of [the relevant professional] function” and (b) “justified in
terms of the deeper moral teleology of [the] profession. It must be shown that some central
institutional value will fail to be realized without the limitation or augmentation of [the
professional’s] authority or [moral] responsibility, and that the realization of this value is worth
the moral price paid for strong role differentiation.” Id. at 7; see id. at 31–33.
15. See Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 5.
16. The following discussion of the lawyer’s roles follows generally ROBERT K. MERTON,
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 422–34 (1968 Enlarged Edition). Merton takes the
position of “Lawyer” or “Parent” to be a “status,” one of a cluster of statuses. Id. at 422–24.
Each status has a “role set,” which is a “complement of role relationships which persons have by
virtue of occupying a particular social status. Id. at 423. The utility of “role” to sociology is
attacked in Margaret A. Coulson, Role: A Redundant Concept in Sociology? Some Educational
Considerations, in ROLE 107 (J.A. Jackson ed., 1972). I agree that my reference to the role
relationship between the lawyer and third persons affected by the representation, but not in direct
interaction with the lawyer, is a stretch.
17. Role differentiation as a justification for particular conduct is controversial. Strong
opposition to role differentiation is found, for example, in the writings of David Luban. See, e.g.,
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104–27 (1988) (arguing that there
is something left of the individual human being after accounting for role, and that both the
individual and the ethics of role are subject to universally valid norms of conduct). For instance,
compare Merton’s analysis on the interaction between cultural norms (Luban’s universally valid
norms of conduct?) with social norms that guide conduct of persons occupying roles. See infra
note 21.
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other schools. Each of these roles carries its own expectations on both sides of
the relationship. None of these relationships can function in the social system
without some “reasonableness”-type modifications of general ethical principles
attached to conduct. So, the general principle of equality among people in
right and desert has to be modified in order to accommodate the preference that
one friend gives the other friend over all others.18 There can be no effective
duty of loyalty without some modification of this general principle of equality.
Similarly, the principle of “do no harm” has to be modified to accommodate
the actions of surgeons, policemen, soldiers, lawyers, and others who, in order
to carry out their functions, must do harm and must treat people unequally.
Role differentiation in ethics then, is not really simply an exception from
the general behavioral norms that regulate social life in the social system.
Rather it is a feature of the web of norms that allow the socially useful
provision of services to persons. So, with respect to his role as agent of a
client, a lawyer’s attention to the general norm of equality of all19 is not the
same as that of the parent with respect to child or spouse, or the policeman
with respect to the enforcement of the criminal law, nor (again in the role of
client’s agent) is the lawyer’s compliance with the norm of not harming others
similar to that of the baker with respect to customers or creditors, or the judge
with respect to fellow judges, parties, or clerks. At the level of application, the
norms that guide conduct allow the provider of socially useful services to
provide them. But to the extent that the costs20 of allowing the lawyer these

18. A famous and controversial article by Professor Charles Fried tries to assimilate the
status of lawyer to that of friend. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). See the caustic response
in the form of a letter to the editors of the Yale Law Journal from Edward A. Dauer and Arthur
Allen Leff, suggesting other moral analogs to the lawyer. See Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen
Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977).
19. Consider the general ethical principle that all are equally entitled to equal treatment, and
the lawyer’s relationship to the general community with respect to the availability of legal
assistance. The lawyer need not treat all applicants for the lawyer’s services equally to the extent
that time and resources allow at the time(s) the question of whether and how to provide services
to a particular person comes up. If the question is whether to discontinue services, the answer is
limited by Model Rule 1.16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2007). But if the
question is taking on a new case, the lawyer may refuse to take any case and limit the degree to
which the lawyer takes it for any reason. See id. at R. 1.2(c). The lawyer is not a public utility,
required to provide service to all comers. Should that be the case? If it is the case, why is it?
Part of the reason might be that a rule requiring the lawyer to serve all comers, subject to
available resources, is not hard to evade by colorable claims concerning the lawyer’s competence
and available resources, and perhaps moral compunctions. Another part has to do with the strong
value placed on individual autonomy in our culture.
20. For one way to calculate the costs and benefits see GOLDMAN supra note 14. It is also
worth asking whether the most important voice in determining the costs and benefits of roledifferentiated ethics is the practicing bar or whether a stronger voice should be given to the lay
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variations exceed the social value of the service, they will be held
“unreasonable” and the lawyer’s conduct will be condemned as unethical.
This should lead to modification of the lawyer’s role-ethics in question.21
Indeed, many social roles are unacceptable and the role-expectations
unreasonable. Consider the role of a criminal with respect to the victims of a
crime.
The many roles played by the lawyer as such and in other positions in
society are not hermetically sealed as against each other, and the lawyer. The
demands of roles and of role-partners can conflict. The lawyer’s roles with
respect to different clients, for example, can conflict in terms of attention given
to each client’s needs. Behavior and attitudes learned in a particular role may
bleed over into the lawyer’s conduct as parent or legislator or friend. Some
roles’ demands may be sufficiently at odds with the lawyer’s view of herself
that she will attempt to avoid as much apparent personal involvement in the act
and its consequences as possible.22 A lawyer representing a party bears a
particular relationship as a disinterested and trusted participant to
governmental and private agencies that hear claims and attempt to settle
disputes. There are expectations of candor and conformity to relevant rules
and norms governing conduct that may compete with the expectations of the
client for zealous pursuit of the client’s ends and the preservation of
confidences. The lawyer also has relationships to persons, other than the
client, affected by the representation and relationships with other lawyers who

public, for example, by doing away with the claim by some state supreme courts that the
regulation of the bar is their exclusive province.
21. Merton insists on keeping cultural norms separate from social norms, the former
including morals. MERTON, supra note 16, at 216. He warns that “[w]hen the cultural and the
social structure are malintegrated, the first calling for behavior and attitudes which the second
precludes, there is a strain toward the breakdown of the norms, toward normlessness” (anomie).
Id. at 217. Such malintegration could also serve as a reason for changing the balance among the
various roles of a lawyer in particular cases, as an exception to the duty of loyalty or
confidentiality, perhaps in favor of third persons. Consider, for example, the adjustment to the
duty of confidentiality in order to take into account the special value of human life and physical
safety. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007). Additionally, compare this with
the less protective treatment of third persons’ property interests. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) & 4.1.
That is, the person occupying a role is also conscious of limits imposed on that role’s ethics by
the more general requirements of the culture in which that role is executed. That awareness can
produce tensions in the agent when the apparent requirements of the role seem to conflict with
these general ethical limitations. This tension could lead to anomie but it also could lead to
reformist tendencies or a decision, in particular cases, simply to ignore the rule applicable to the
role insofar as it is in conflict with the relevant cultural norms.
22. See Chad Gordon, Role and Value Development Across the Life-Cycle, in ROLE 65, 69
(J.A. Jackson ed., 1972). The concept of Role Distance is used by Prof. Luban to argue that there
is an authentic, extra-role person functioning as a moral agent in each person acting in the social
system. See LUBAN, supra note 17, at 106–07 (referring to the work of the sociologist Erving
Goffman).
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practice in the lawyer’s community, whether territorially or professionally
defined. Like any other person in a community, a lawyer has a special
relationship to that community which the execution of that person’s roles
affects. The Model Rules can be presented as a way in which the American
Bar Association proposes that the bar regulate this competition among role
partners for the lawyer’s attention and concern, placing the greatest importance
in the lawyer’s loyalty-infused relationship with the individual client.
B.

The Centrality of the Duty of Loyalty (How Does Ethics Come Up?)

If the student sees that a lawyer must choose between serving a client’s
purposes and doing what the lawyer thinks, under other circumstances (in other
social contexts), would be the right thing to do, the student dealing with this
choice can see two potential ways out of the dilemma. First, the student might
take the radical relativist position and state that different people in different
places see things differently, and all their views are equally valid. The student
may therefore insist on a reading of the norm most likely to help the lawyer
succeed for the client and resist any suggestions for changes in the applicable
rule that may make it more difficult to succeed for the client. Second, the
student might appeal to strong role differentiation and insist that things are
different for lawyers, because of the lawyer’s function as guarantor of the
client’s liberty and access to the legal system. The problem of radical
relativism has already received good treatment, and I refer the reader to
Bradley Wendel’s lesson on how to respond to this position.23 The problem of
role differentiation is dealt with above.24
Most of the legal questions raised in the course can be discussed without
asking the law student to refer to the student’s ethics. Most questions about the
exercise of discretion will be answered with reference to the lawyer’s legal
duty of loyalty to the client and the exceptions to that duty in particular cases.
The remaining questions concerning determining the right thing to do come up
in two ways:
(1) The Model Rules, and state variations of those rules, deserve
classroom consideration not only as a source of lawyer-regulatory law, but also
with respect to their consistency with the limits on tolerable variation of
cultural norms of adequate respect for persons, fairness, and justice. Questions
should be raised about the balance set by the Model Rules among the role-

23. See W. Bradley Wendel, Ethics for Skeptics, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 165 (2002); W. Bradley
Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 711
(2002). As to the philosophical and practical problems raised when one denies a universally true
ethics, but nevertheless takes ethics seriously, and must therefore deal with relativism, see
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 120–31 (1985).
24. See supra Part II.A.
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partners25 competing for the lawyer’s attention and concern.26 Do the Rules
strike the optimum balance given the harm done as a result? The student
discovers that the third person, likely to be affected adversely by the
representation, is provided thin protection against the lawyer’s zeal.27 Agencies
of government are given protection against the overzealous representation of a
client, with respect to assuring the legitimacy and efficiency of their
operations.28 Respect for law is enjoined, albeit gingerly.29 There is even a
general prohibition on conduct that is inconsistent with that of a person of
proper character (a nod to virtue ethics?),30 and a mysterious reference to a
lawyer’s option not to take extreme measures for the client’s sake in the first
comment to Rule 1.3.31 Here, the student is asked to look at the relevant rules
from the point of view of a lawyer and from the point of view of another
person (whose place in the social system might match one of the positions that
might be occupied by the student).32 Can a lawyer adequately critique the
25. The Model Rules recognize different functional relationships between the lawyer and
others. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).
26. It is useful to compare the variations in various adopted versions of the Model Rules, for
different judgments as to whether different third party claims on the lawyer’s concern are
tolerable in terms of the efficient performance of the lawyer’s job for the client.
27. The lawyer’s responsibilities as an evaluator for third persons is dealt with in Rule 2.3,
including the hesitantly-developed law of third-party liability for failure to exercise proper care in
the writing of opinions and similar activity directed at third persons. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 2.3 (2007); see id. at R. 3.4 (pertaining to fairness in adversarial proceedings); id. at
R. 4.1 (pertaining to making false statements, and, subject to the duty of confidentiality,
preventing the effective commission of a crime or fraud by the client); id. at R. 4.2 (pertaining to
protecting the attorney-client relationship of opponents); id. at R. 4.3 (pertaining to the treatment
of unrepresented persons); id. at R. 4.4 (prohibiting harassment of third parties and violation of
third parties’ legal rights in the course of obtaining evidence); see also id. at R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3),
1.13(c) (providing exceptions to the duty of confidentiality).
28. Id. at R. 3.1–3.8. Also consider Model Rule 3.9 with respect to appearances in
nonadjudicative proceedings. Id. at R. 3.9.
29. The lawyer may not “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Id. at R. 8.4(b). Nor may a
lawyer council or assist a client in “conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,” nor
“knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is in violation of applicable rules of
judicial conduct or other law.” Id. at R. 1.2(d), 8.4(f).
30. Id. at R. 8.4.
31. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a
client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in
determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer’s
duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or
preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and
respect.
Id. For speculation as to what this means, see infra Appendix.
32. As noted earlier, once role-differentiated ethics bump up against the limits set by
generally applicable cultural norms of conduct, the resulting dissonance will result in (a) a
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rules that direct the lawyer’s conduct and purport to justify or excuse the
lawyer’s activity’s social costs?33
Subject only to the cryptic comment to Rule 1.3, noted above, the duty of
loyalty seems to be peremptory, except as it is clearly made inapplicable by the
rules themselves. The lawyer is bound to serve the client with loyalty to seek
the best and most efficient path to the client’s goals. This means that the
lawyer has no options, no way to other-favoring conduct (which would come at
the expense of the client), but must choose between loyalty and disloyalty. For
example, if a lawyer receives an inadvertently sent fax or document and that
fax or document reveals information that was confidential and thereby
protected from disclosure to the lawyer or her client, then to the extent that the
rules allow it, the lawyer must read and use the information in the document to
the client’s advantage.34 This, even though the lawyer thinks it is somehow
unfair, perhaps wrong, to peek and tell.35
rejection of cultural norms by the person faced with the conflict or (b) a revision of the rules to
keep them within the limits set by the cultural norms, either informally, by the lawyer’s conduct
contrary to the rule, or formally, by official interpretation or actual revision of the relevant rule.
See supra notes 20–21.
33. See supra note 14 (discussing justifications for role differentiated ethics in particular
cases in which the lawyer’s role-directed conduct threatens or injures others).
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2007).
35. However, consider the grant of discretion in Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4, which states
that whether to return a mis-sent document unread is a decision that is “a matter of professional
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.” Id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 3. The reference to Model Rules
1.2 and 1.4 is odd, as they seem to deny, rather than grant, the lawyer discretion that is not subject
to the client’s veto. See also supra note 30. Moreover, ordinary agency law should give the
principal a veto with respect to this question. One function of the duty of loyalty, after all, is to
reduce the client’s agency costs of checking on the lawyer’s diligence and faithfulness to the
principal. To the extent that that duty (and the concomitant duty of confidentiality) is weakened,
so is the value of the lawyer’s service to the client. It is unlikely that the possibility of inadvertent
disclosure seriously reduces the value to the client of the duty of confidentiality. As to
inadvertent disclosures, see Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory From Attorney
Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767 (2005). The
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recently reversed its earlier
strong position against reading and using the protected information. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006). This attitude in favor of loyalty over what
might be termed “fair play” is reinforced by Formal Opinion 06-442, with respect to an attorney’s
inspection of metadata in electronic documents, and by implication, metadata in other documents
received from opponents. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442
(2006). According to Formal Op. 06-442:
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not contain any specific prohibition against
a lawyer’s reviewing and using embedded information in electronic documents, whether
received from opposing counsel, an adverse party, or an agent of an adverse party. A
lawyer who is concerned about the possibility of sending, producing, or providing to
opposing counsel a document that contains or might contain metadata, or who wishes to
take some action to reduce or remove the potentially harmful consequences of its
dissemination, may be able to limit the likelihood of its transmission by “scrubbing”
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(2) When does a lawyer have discretion to act in a way that conflicts with
the client’s interests and the relevant rules? It is not always clear what sort of
discretion the lawyer has beyond that to choose the best route to success for the
client. Generally, a lawyer can “go easy” on the opposition (e.g., by
consenting to continuances or agreeing to a discovery regime that gives the
opposing counsel greater ease in requesting and getting possibly damaging
material) if the purpose of that move is to make the adversary process more
smooth and less costly to the client, without reducing the client’s chance for
success in the matter.36 But what of the lawyer’s sense that something is very
wrong with the lawyer’s powerful pursuit of the client’s ends in the face of
inadequate opposition or in those cases in which the opposition is (unfairly)
hobbled by lack of information? This suggests three questions for discussion:
(i) Questions should be raised about the appropriateness of simply
ignoring the applicable rules in particular cases, especially those involving the
divulgence of clients’ secrets to avoid or mitigate danger to third persons’
interests and those in which pursuit of the client’s interest with full zeal may
result in an injustice.37
(ii) A related question regards the proper approach to interpreting rules,
such as the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality or loyalty, in order to
achieve a just or fair result despite the client’s wishes,38 as well as the rules
against deceit,39 in order to help enforce legal duties of others or otherwise
achieve a good end40 and to further the interests of the client.41

metadata from documents or by sending a different version of the document without the
embedded information.
Id.
36. That may be all that the first comment to Model Rule 1.3 is about in its permission to
counsel not to use the most aggressive measures in the client’s behalf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007); see infra Appendix.
37. E.g., softening the lawyer’s adversarial zeal in order to make up for a failure in the
adversary system of legal representation to assure a fair outcome. The usual problem is that of
the unrepresented or inadequately represented opponent. How does a lawyer adjust to cases of
that sort without losing the habit of zealous representation and reducing the value to clients of the
duty of loyalty?
38. See infra Part II.D.
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2007). For the rules that govern
advising or assisting the client to engage in such acts, see id. at R. 8.4(a), 1.2(d). The Oregon
Supreme Court took a hard-nosed position with respect to reading the relevant rule. In re
Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000). As a result, Oregon changed its rule in order to
accommodate approved lying:
Notwithstanding DR 1-102(A)(1), (A)(3) and (A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(5), it shall not be
professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to supervise
lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or
constitutional rights, provided the lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these
disciplinary rules. “Covert activity,” as used in this rule, means an effort to obtain
information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other
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(iii) Finally, questions should be raised about the interpretation and
implementation of rules that allow the lawyer to take action against the
interests of the client. How should the lawyer decide whether to exercise the
option provided by such rules? How should the lawyer decide how to exercise
these options? This is the subject of the next section of this essay.
C. Permission to be Neither Loyal Nor Discreet
Some of the Model Rules allow the lawyer to work against the client’s
interests. This might involve disclosure or use of information protected by the
rule of confidentiality42 or it might involve the lawyer’s refusal of assistance.43
The reason for allowing the lawyer to take such action may be the preservation
of the lawyer’s own welfare, it might be the preservation of third parties from
harm, or it might be to serve the interests of the community or an agency of
that community (e.g., a court or legislature). In any case, it must be clear that
once the permission kicks in, the duty of loyalty to the client falls away. This
has to be the case because, were the duty of loyalty to remain in force, none of
the permissions to act contrary to the client’s interests could be taken. Without
that duty, the constellation of claims on the lawyer’s attention and concern
changes. The lawyer’s role with respect to the client is devalued, as against the
lawyer’s role with respect to third persons, tribunals, or those who depend on
the lawyer for their own economic welfare.44

subterfuge. “Covert activity,” may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer as an
advisor or supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable
possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the
foreseeable future.
OR. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (2006).
40. See, e.g., In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002) (finding a prosecuting attorney who
posed as a public defender in order to obtain a suspect’s surrender guilty of “conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”); see also W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth
Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, Lying, and “Lying with an
Explanation”, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 53 (2002) (discussing the Pautler case and other cases in which
misleading statements were made by an attorney).
41. Here, one can talk about the difference between lying and “puffing,” or other deceitful
practices in the service of the client. The latest material on this subject published by the ABA is
Formal Opinion 06-439, Lawyer’s Obligation of Truthfulness when Representing a Client in
Negotiation: Application to Caucused Mediation. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). Most lawyers would agree that there is a difference
between lying and “puffery” and argue that the latter is not deceitful. Of course the “puffer” is
likely “puffing” in order to persuade the other party to the negotiation to accept and act in
accordance with the “puffing.” It is also worth getting into the difference between misleading
and lying statements in litigation. See Hodes, supra note 40, at 67 (discussing defense tactics in
the trial of David Westerfield for the abduction and murder of a child).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).
43. Id. at R. 1.16.
44. E.g., partners or family members.
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An interesting question45 is whether the permission granted under these
rules is waivable? It is interesting because it invites a discussion of the
purpose of the permissions and their effect on the lawyer’s ethical duties to
third persons. I can think of three ways of looking at these permissions. (a)
They provide a safety valve for lawyers who need such a way out for their own
mental health. They are a kind of burn-out preventative. The lawyer may
serve her own interests at the expense of the client’s interests in tough
circumstances.46 By this view, the exercise of the opportunity given by the
exception is suboptimal with respect to the provision of legal services, but the
harm is minimal given the small number of times the exception is likely to be
relevant to the lawyer’s decision as to what to do. (b) They provide a reason
for doing the right thing under special circumstances. That is, the lawyer may
choose to help others at the client’s expense.47 (c) They are a judgment that
the protection given the client by the rules with these exceptions is optimal for
the provision of legal services. The cost of these narrow exceptions to the
client-attorney relationship is unimportant, which gives weight to the social
interests that the lawyer serves in making use of them. The balance struck
between the claim of the client and all other claims on the lawyer’s concern is
just right. If this third reading is given the exceptions to the lawyer’s duties of
confidentiality and loyalty, then the waiver of the permissions granted by the
rules would give the client more protection than is deemed by the bar to be
necessary to the proper and faithful delivery of legal services. It is anomalous
to allow the lawyer to give such extra protection and at the same time claim
that what the lawyer does to the detriment of others in the client’s service is
justified by role-differentiated ethics! The choice is then between (a) the
exceptions’ being a necessary evil, given the mental health of the lawyer, and
(c) the exceptions’ being a recognition that the optimal availability of legal
services includes taking these other interests (set out in the exceptions) into
account. To me, the third approach is the best understanding of the exceptions.
The authors of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers48
and those who drafted the preamble and comments to the Model Rules of

45. For this question, I thank the participants on the listserv for the Association of
Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL). See Association of Professional Responsibility
Lawyers, http://www.aprl.net/ (last visited May 25, 2007).
46. For instance, see the “self defense” rule, Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), for an example of a
plainly self-serving exception to the duty of confidentiality. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b)(5) (2007). Additionally, see Model Rule 1.16(b) for the reasons for exit despite harm to
the client under. See id at R. 1.16(b).
47. This plainly does not fit the “self defense” rule. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(5). Nor does it fit
the rules allowing the lawyer to withdraw to the client’s detriment in order to preserve the
lawyer’s own pride, comfort, or financial health. See id. at R. 1.16(b).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
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Professional Conduct49 seem to have lined up on the side of the safety-valve
approach; they take a very permissive view of the lawyer’s decision to act, or
the lawyer’s actions under these rules.50 The Restatement precludes discipline
for acting or refusing to act according to the permission granted by the rules. It
does not, however, appear to preclude discipline for improper interpretation of
the predicate conditions51 to the permission to act against the client’s interests.
There seems, then, to be no prohibition on contracting away all these
permissions by agreement. The opposing view—that the permissions must be
considered case-by-case and may not be waived—would require the lawyer to
react at each circumstance in which the permission becomes possibly available.
But even if this commentary makes arbitrary the lawyer’s decision whether
and how to exercise the discretion granted by the Rules, it does not abate the
ethical pressures behind these permissions. Recall that there is no Rulesrecognized conflict between acting as permitted by the Rules and the Rulesimposed duty of loyalty or confidentiality.52 It is also fair game for discussion
as to whether the ALI and the ABA were mistaken in their implicit
characterization of these rules’ permissions.53

49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007). Paragraph 14 of the Model Rules’
Preamble and Scope refers to the permissions discussed in this section and states: “No
disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds
of such discretion.” Id. at ¶ 14.
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66 cmt. g (2000); id.
at § 67 cmt. k; id. at § 120 cmt. j, cmt. k (precluding contracting away the discretion to exclude
testimony “reasonably believed to be false” with a reference to Rule 23(1)). There is no other
prohibition on contracting out of the exercise of discretion. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 14 (2007) (refering to the permissions discussed in this section, and stating:
“No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the
bounds of such discretion.”).
51. The problem of interpretation as an ethics problem is discussed infra beginning at note
56.
52. The rejection of any discipline-enforced duty to exercise discretion also does not
preclude possible common law liability to third persons for conduct not required by the Model
Rules. Why not make contracts to waive exercise of these permissions unenforceable as a matter
of “public policy”? There is surely no problem of infecting lawyers’ decisions with conflicts of
interest in such a move, any more than the permissions granted by the Rules to act in a way that is
inconsistent with the client’s interest raises a problem of conflict of interests under the Rules.
53. It might also be worthwhile to ask whether, absent the threat of discipline protecting the
third party, the common law should impose a duty of care on the lawyer with respect to the
person who is harmed by the lawyer’s conduct and with whom the lawyer has a relationship in
the course of his representation, where such conduct is not required by the lawyer’s ethics of role.
See Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361, 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (denying such a duty).
What should stand in the way of such a duty if the lawyer is perfectly capable of understanding
the danger and avoiding it, and there is no countervailing duty of loyalty or confidentiality?
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D. Deciding to Exercise the Option Not to be Loyal: Ethics of Interpretation
There are two steps to be taken before the lawyer is in a position to act on
the grant of discretion. The first step is the interpretation of the predicate
conditions for taking advantage of the permission. The second step is the
determination of what steps are permissible and which steps are mandatory.54
How should the lawyer approach these steps? As to the first step, how should
the lawyer approach the problem of interpretation and application?
As to the second step, to what extent should the lawyer take into account
the possible harm from his actions to the client? When considering what to do,
the lawyer no longer has the strong duty of loyalty imposed by the lawyer’s
role morality, but the client, as a person or as a representative of persons55 is
still entitled to some consideration under general cultural norms requiring a
good reason for harming someone. Although that claim on the lawyer’s
concern is that of a person with no special relationship to the lawyer, the
person still has a claim on the lawyer’s concern with respect to the decision to
act, just because the lawyer’s conduct may cause harm.
As to the first step, interpretation of the predicate conditions, consider the
problems raised by Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), which allows the lawyer to exclude
evidence he “reasonably believes” is false:
A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has
offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary,
disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than
the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably
56
believes is false.

54. This includes only exceptions that become mandatory by virtue of the nature of the
disclosure or harm to be voided by the disclosure. This does not include exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality that are mandatory by virtue of the Rules, themselves, as in some states’ variations
on Model Rule 1.6. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006) (“A lawyer shall
reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from
committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm.”); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT, RPC 1.6 (b) (2006). New Jersey’s variation on Rule 1.6(b) states:
A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client or another person:
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of another;
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RPC 1.6 (b) (2006).
55. I doubt that artificial persons are owed any ethical consideration except insofar as they
represent the interests of humans.
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007).
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Does the interpretation of the predicate pose an ethical as well as a legal
problem?57 It seems odd to think of interpretation as an ethical matter having
to do with what one should do or how one should live. But where there is
more than one defensible reading of a rule, should one alternative be preferred
given general norms against doing harm and according all persons equal
concern, subject to duties to others? That is, is there a preferred reading, given
role morality and its limits? The agent is asked in this case to determine
whether a reading in favor of loyalty would trench too much on more general
norms.58 But he is also asked to see to his role-moral duties to his client. One
particularly concerned with the possible cavalier treatment of the duty of
loyalty in tough cases might be inclined rather easily to the position that the
lawyer, still under that duty, must read the exception with a bias against the
loyalty-denying act. Such an approach limits the denial of loyalty to the
narrowest range of cases. However, this is permission that the Restatement
prohibits the lawyer from waiving,59 which emphasizes the lawyer’s role
relationship with the tribunal. This suggests both that the lawyer’s permission
to exclude evidence he “reasonably believes” is false amounts to a duty to
exercise judgment and that the judgment should be exercised in a way that
values strongly the role of the lawyer with respect to the tribunal in its search
for the truth.60 This approach to reading the rule weakens the claim of the
client to the lawyer’s loyalty when the lawyer is faced with a question of
falsity of potential evidence.
Rule 3.3(a)(3) limits the lawyer’s occasion for this exercise of discretion in
the introduction of suspected false evidence to its introduction.61 If a lawyer
comes to know that the lawyer, her client, or a witness called by her has
presented evidence that the lawyer later “reasonably believes is false” remedial
measures should be taken.62 What is the difference between offering
“evidence that the lawyer knows to be false” and evidence that the lawyer
57. The task of interpretation is supposed to be one of finding out the “true” meaning of a
written statement with respect to the problem at hand. A reference to reasonable belief and
necessity, however, does not point to a purely objective quantity. It calls upon the lawyer to
exercise judgment as to where there is sufficient information to justify a change in role-attitude.
58. See supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text (suggesting that general ethical
principles impose outer limits on the extension of role morality’s potential to allow harm to
others).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. j (2000).
60. One might call this role “officer of the court” or, as the Model Rules call it in the first
paragraph of the preamble, “officer of the legal system.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT pmbl. (2007). Neither title has much content beyond a reference to the lawyer’s
important participation in the processing of cases before a tribunal. A lay-person representing
herself in court would play the same role, to the extent she knows how to do it, and should have
the same kind of duties to the tribunal.
61. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
62. See id.
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“reasonably believes is false”? The definitions at the beginning of the Model
Rules don’t help. By these definitions, “‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge” 63
and “‘reasonably’ when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.”64 So, a lawyer who
“reasonably believes” that evidence is false must, as a reasonably competent
lawyer, actually believe that it is false. How does one distinguish between
actually knowing (and therefore believing) something is false and just actually
believing it? The verbal distinction between “reasonably believes” and
“knows” already has been subjected to scholarly examination65 and much
confusing and opaque judicial discussion. One way to look at it, and preserve
the distinction’s usefulness, is to make it into a distinction between moral
certainty (knowledge) and belief based on less than information sufficient to
base a moral certainty (reasonable belief).
What must the ethical lawyer do at the stage of deciding whether to
exercise discretion? If it is impossible to distinguish reasonable belief from
knowledge, then all the questionable evidence goes in. If, on the other hand,
the ethical lawyer can distinguish between the two, then he must ask: Is there
any reason in ethics, given the constellation of roles that exists once the
predicate condition of “reasonable belief” is met, that would persuade the
lawyer nevertheless to introduce it despite such a reasonable belief? If there is
a reasonable suspicion of falsity of particular potential evidence, then as a
practical matter, the second step is easy: may = must! The ethical lawyer may
not submit evidence that he “reasonably believes” is false.66
Of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, three require that the
lawyer “reasonably believes” disclosure is necessary to protect interests of
third persons,67 and two allow the lawyer to reveal secrets in order to protect

63. Id. at R. 1.0(f).
64. Id. at R. 1.0(h).
65. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1271–73 (2003).
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007).
67. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3).
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of
a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services . . . .
Id.
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himself.68 What is “reasonably believed necessary” to protect the lawyer’s
interests under Rule 1.6(b)(5)69 is likely to be very broadly construed by the
bar and the courts.70 Is there more to be said about exercising this option?
More likely than not, the same liberality will be shown with regard to the
lawyer’s determination of “reasonable belief” under Rule 1.6(b)(4), if only
because it is an invitation to the conscientious lawyer to make sure he is in
compliance with the rules.
As to the first three exceptions, the area for lawyer’s discretion is more
difficult to discern. The lawyer must have a “reasonable belief” as to the
importance of revelation of information to some future event—preventing or
ameliorating harm.71 The future harm must be “reasonably certain.”72 Again,
the lawyer (and the student) must ask about the level of skepticism with which
a loyal lawyer must greet the information suggesting preventable or
ameliorable harm and, indeed, whether the lawyer should seek further
information (there being no duty under the Model Rules or in the Restatement
to investigate further). When death or substantial bodily harm is the thing to
be prevented, I suspect the “reasonable belief” will be easier to achieve than it
will in the case of harm to financial or property interests.73 But that, of course,
does not end the inquiry. What does, what must, the lawyer do? By the
language of the rule, a lawyer may ignore the consequences and keep the
secrets, whether the impending danger is to a life or a business or an interest in

68. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(4)–(5).
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client . . . .
Id.
69. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(5).
70. See supra note 12.
71. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3) (2007).
72. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(1). I read “reasonably certain” to modify both “death” and
“substantial bodily harm” under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1).
73. Some states’ versions of the Model Rules take seriously the distinction between life and
bodily injury on the one hand and harm to property or finances on the other, taking the former far
more seriously in terms of required as opposed to voluntary disclosure (at least, in some states,
with respect to information about criminal conduct). See ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6 (2006); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1.6 (2006); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2006); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 32:1.6 (2006); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006), N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RPC 1.6 (2006); N.M. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-106 (2006); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05
(2006); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT SCR 20:1.6 (2006).
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property.74 With respect to the latter, notice that the lawyer, if involved in any
way with the possible financial harm, may reveal the information to limit his
own exposure to civil or criminal penalties for aiding the client’s fraud or
crime, under the self-defense rule.75 Should it be harder for the lawyer to
protect a third person from financial ruin than to protect the lawyer from civil
liability?
That the information was received in confidence, and that the lawyer
induced the belief in confidentiality by her own actions, still counts for
something, of course. Revelation of secrets is very much like promise
breaking in that it is allowed but only where the reason for the breach is plainly
good enough. The client, whatever she may have done and whatever the harm
that might be done or threatened, is still entitled to the lawyer’s concern.
Whatever the rule says, it should be easy to show that saving a life is the best
thing to do, all things considered, given that the apparent necessity of the
revelation to the saving of the life is questionable and that the harm to the
client by the revelation is great.
A fairly commonly given hypothetical case that raises both the problem of
interpretation of predicate conditions and the problem of choice of action is
one in which the client violates pollution law by letting arsenic flow into a lake
used by others for fishing and swimming. The amounts are small, but arsenic
accumulates in the bones and eventually can kill. If a person eats enough fish
caught in the lake or if a person swims enough in the lake then the person will
likely die. Warn everyone now and the harm will certainly be prevented, but is
that harm within the terms of the rule that allows the disclosure? A lawyer
who is neither a chemist nor a biologist believes that someone will die
eventually. He really doesn’t know how much arsenic is dangerous, how much
fish from the lake has been consumed during the toxic emissions, or how many
times each person swam in the lake and swallowed lake water. Is that enough
to go on? If it is, must the lawyer tell? The attitude of the lawyer to the
problem is critically important, in my opinion.
A client is married and has informed the lawyer that she is trying to
conceive a child. The information is confidential and relates to the
representation. The lawyer knows that she has been having an affair, and that
the affair was broken off shortly after the lover was diagnosed HIV positive.
The husband does not know of the affair and the client is anxious that he not
find out. Substantial bodily harm? The family is wealthy and can easily afford
treatment to palliate the effects of the infection. But the husband is in danger
of getting infected from the wife (or is he having an affair, etc.?), and then
there is the potential person who will result from a successful attempt at
conception. That is all the lawyer knows. He has no medical knowledge and
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2007).
75. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(5).
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is only aware of some of the more generally-accessible material on AIDS.
May the lawyer tell? Must the lawyer tell? In both cases the problem the
lawyer faces is not soluble by looking at the words of the Rule, nor is it by the
purpose of the Rule.76
Compare the case in which the harm to be prevented or ameliorated is
financial and was or is likely to be caused by the client’s fraud or crime “in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.”77
The same sort of problem arises as to the satisfaction of the predicate, but it is
less serious than is the danger posed to third persons in the preceding
paragraph. Does that make the decision to tell harder? What of corporate
counsel who is considering disclosure under Rule 1.13(c)?78 In the case of
corporate counsel, the interests are different. The lawyer’s role relationship
with the client is mediated by people who, in law, have no claim on the
lawyer’s loyalty. Yet the revelation of the information, reasonably believed to
be necessary to protect the client because of a probable violation of law that
the lawyer reasonably believes is reasonably certain to harm the client, will
plainly harm someone with whom the human relationship looks like a
relationship of trust.
The lawyer’s own interests are plainly in view with respect to the decision
to terminate the representation.79 A reading of the catch-all phrase at the end

76. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. Is the permission to disclose simply a
safety-valve for the ethically-troubled lawyer, or is it a more powerful statement that such
protection of confidentiality is not necessary to the socially optimal availability of legal
assistance?
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007).
78. See id. at R. 1.13(c).
Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that
can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and
appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to
the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
Id.
79. I do not discuss the ethics of refusing or accepting a client. That requires a different law
review article. On the other hand, there is some intertwining of the discussion of the ethics of
refusing continued aid with the discussion of refusing the representation at the beginning. There
are two major differences: One is that there is traditionally a strong individualist undercurrent in
our common culture, which strongly cuts in favor of the lawyer’s free choice; the other is that
when the question of withdrawal from service comes up, there is already a relationship
established with the client and some expectation on the part of the latter, consistent with the role
of client with respect to that lawyer, of special consideration.
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of the list of grounds for withdrawal80 as limited to the kinds of grounds
already listed, would be in keeping with the often-cited rule of statutory
interpretation, ejusdem generis.81 Once again, the ethics issue is raised by the
existing human relationship between the client and the lawyer, and the
continuing need of the client for legal help from a person who understands that
client’s situation.
Finally, there’s Rule 4.3, which allows a lawyer who is dealing “on behalf
of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel” to advise that
person to get a lawyer.82 In some cases, that advice could serve the lawyer’s
own client by assuring a competent negotiation partner and hence a deal that
will stand up. In other cases, the advice could hinder the lawyer’s efforts to
achieve success for the client. The purpose of the rule seems to be to protect
the unrepresented person’s interests. It also protects the lawyer from
inadvertently slipping into the role of lawyer to that third person, thereby
sinking the lawyer into a conflict of interests that might compel the lawyer to
withdraw from the case. According to the District of Columbia Bar and The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the lawyer may provide
at least such advice to the third person.83 The Restatement position, which
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2007) (“Except as stated in
paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if . . . (7) other good cause for
withdrawal exists.”).
81. “Ejusdem generis” is “a canon of construction that when a general word or phrase
follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of
the same type as those listed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2001).
82. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2007).
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer
shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in
the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The
lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to
secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the
client.
Id. (emphasis added).
83. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 326 (2004), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion326.cfm; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000).
A lawyer’s duty of reasonable care to a prospective client. When a prospective client and
a lawyer discuss the possibility of representation, the lawyer might comment on such
matters as whether the person has a promising claim or defense, whether the lawyer is
appropriate for the matter in question, whether conflicts of interest exist and if so how
they might be dealt with, the time within which action must be taken and, if the
representation does not proceed, what other lawyer might represent the prospective client.
Prospective clients might rely on such advice, and lawyers therefore must use reasonable
care in rendering it. The lawyer must also not harm a prospective client through
unreasonable delay after indicating that the lawyer might undertake the representation.
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provides that the lawyer has a minimal duty of care to the third person, whether
or not that third person opposes a current client of the lawyer’s, seems right.84
It is consistent with the idea that the lawyer’s undivided loyalty to the client is
justified by an oft-failed basic assumption of the adversary system, as stated in
D.C. Bar opinion 326:
More basically, inherent in our adversary system is the principle that
persons ought to be represented by competent lawyers and that disputes ought
to be resolved on their merits. Assisting a person to obtain competent
representation is entirely consistent with that principle. Once the issue is
joined, a lawyer can and should take whatever lawful and ethical measures that
are required to vindicate her client’s position. Assisting an adversary to obtain
competent representation, so that the issue can be joined, is not inconsistent
with that duty. It is consistent, however, with the lawyer’s obligation to the
administration of justice. At times, the interests of the legal system and the
public interest may prevail over that of the client, e.g., Rule 3.3(a)(3). We
believe that recommending competent counsel to an unrepresented person, can
85
never constitute prejudice to a client within the meaning of Rule 1.3(a).

This leaves the question of the lawyer’s knowledge about her clients—that
advice to seek counsel might affect a client adversely—when such advice is
actually to be disclosed. I cannot find any reason for not advising the third
person to get legal counsel (or, for that matter, that the period of limitations is
running) when the lawyer is not aware that he represents the opponent. The
case law and the Restatement indicate that the lawyer must give such advice
and, indeed, advise the client about the period of limitations.86 What if the
lawyer knows that she represents the third person’s opponent and that getting a
lawyer will put the third party in a better position to oppose her client? Both
the Restatement comment and the D.C. Bar opinion indicate that giving such
advice does not conflict with the duty of loyalty.87 That is, there is no role-

What care is reasonable depends on the circumstances, including the lawyer’s expertise
and the time available for consideration.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000).
84. For a contrary view, see Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950 (1994).
85. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 326 (2004), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion326.cfm.
86. See Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (affirming a
finding that an attorney was guilty of negligence for failing to advise the plaintiff of the two-year
medical malpractice limitations period); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000).
87. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 326 (2004), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinmions/opinion326.cfm; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000).
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based reason for not providing it. Hence, the Togstad case and the
Restatement counsel in favor of providing it.88
CONCLUSION
The ethics of representation is a relatively small part of the course in the
law governing lawyers. It is unique to the course insofar as it calls upon the
student to examine his or her own ethics as lawyers. This is especially
poignant for the student when confronted with the chance to make a decision
that goes against the client’s interests, either by an act of civil disobedience—
open disloyalty in the name of the common good—or by accepting and
exercising the discretion granted the lawyer by the rules. In such discussions
the student is compelled to recall that there are, in fact, norms to which that
student has subscribed governing social conduct and that the student’s
rationalization of conduct of questionable ethics must stand against the
student’s own honest assessment of that conduct. Of course, the student can
deny ethical responsibility for conduct and take the strong self-serving position
that both accepts the duty of loyalty (reduced to a legal duty) and at the same
time fearlessly embraces the self-defense and similar rules that allow the
lawyer to jump ship when the seas get too rough.
What should be the instructor’s role in all of this? Is the instructor a
neutral observer, leading the student through the exercise but taking no
position on the point of that exercise? Neutrality should prevent the instructor
from raising ethics issues at all. Raising questions of ethics at least takes the
position that those questions are important to the student. Unfortunately, it is
usually the instructor who will raise them.

88. See Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 694–95; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000).
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APPENDIX
RULE 1.3: A GRANT OF DISCRETION?
Model Rule 1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.”89 This formulation of the lawyer’s duty
replaced various Disciplinary Rules (DRs) of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.90 DR 7-101, entitled “Representing a Client Zealously,”
enjoined the lawyer to “seek the lawful objectives of his client through
reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary
Rules . . . .”91 Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.3 elaborates on the term
“reasonable diligence”:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A
lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not
bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a
client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional
discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See
Rule 1.2. The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require
the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in
92
the legal process with courtesy and respect.

The first two sentences of this comment are consistent with the
predecessors’ insistence on “zealous representation,” but the third sentence,
italicized in the above quote, seems to say that the lawyer may decide to bank
the fires of zeal and refuse to “press for every advantage that might be realized
for a client.”93 It is a grant of discretion with respect to “the means by which a
matter should be pursued,” but what sort discretion; as to what? Might it be:
(a) full discretion as to means, in order to avoid harsh or unfair measures?94

89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
90. The relevant DRs are 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(1,3). See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(1), (3) (1983).
91. Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1).
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
94. A comment is a strange place for such a large grant of discretion—discretion to choose a
less effective means for the sake of fairness. For another odd apparent grant of discretion free of
the client’s veto, see Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4, which allows the lawyer to refuse to read a
mis-sent document and return the document to opposing counsel. See id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 3. That
move could prevent the lawyer from using information beneficial to the client’s cause, which
would seem to violate, or disregard the duty of loyalty to the client. For more on that comment,
see supra note 35. I suspect that the decision to read or not read, return or not return, will be
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(b) full discretion as to means in those cases in which the selection of means is
not important to the expeditious achievement of the client’s ends? (c)
discretion to adjust the lawyer’s conduct to prevailing norms of conduct in the
locality or the other social context in which the lawyer practices?
The decisions as to both ends and means are up to the client according to
Model Rule 1.2(a).95 As to ends, the client controls. As to means, the lawyer
must consult with the client who, by the ordinary rules of agency law, may
order the lawyer to take such means as the lawyer may pursue legally. The
lawyer’s only way out is to resign, if that is allowed.96 Unless there is some set
of “means” that are beyond the reach of the terms of Model Rule 1.2(a), either
Comment 1 is at war with Rule 1.2(a) or there is nothing to which the grant of
discretion in Comment 1 of Model Rule 1.3 applies. Means to which Rule
1.2(a) does not apply includes means as to which there is no chance to confer
with the client reasonably or intelligently, such as decisions as to tactics in
court or in negotiation.97 But, even here, does not the duty of loyalty to the
client command that counsel choose the most efficient means to achieve the
client’s ends? Before concluding that it means nothing whatever, perhaps a
look at the history of this provision will help determine what sort of discretion
it gives the lawyer to choose conduct that does not further, and may hinder, the
pursuit of the client’s objectives.
The closest ancestors to Comment 1 of Model Rule 1.3 are DR 7-101, and
Ethical Considerations (ECs) 7-9, 7-10, and 7-38 of the 1983 Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Disciplinary Rule, which commands the
lawyer to pursue the client’s goals with all legal means, states that:
[a] lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to
reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of
his client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by
avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all
98
persons involved in the legal process.

made according to local custom, which is a limit on the duty of zealous loyalty that may be
referred to in Comment 1 to Rule 1.3.
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). The relevant provision states
that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and,
as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued.” Id. at R. 1.2(a). Model Rule 1.4 requires that the lawyer provide information sufficient
to let the client “make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Id. at R. 1.4(b).
96. See id. at R. 1.16(b). “[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if . . . the
client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has
a fundamental disagreement . . . .” Id. at R. 1.16(b)(4). The 2001 version of this Model Rule
limited the lawyer’s option to leave cases in which the lawyer found “an objective . . . repugnant.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2001).
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 3 (2007).
98. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1983).
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Both ECs 7-9 and 7-10 enjoin the lawyer to seek the “best interests of his
client” (EC 7-9)99 and “represent his client with zeal” (EC 7-10).100 But,
according to EC 7-9, “when an action in the best interests of his client seems to
him to be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to forego such action.”101
EC 7-10 adds that the duty to the client “does not militate against his
concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the
legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.”102 EC 7-38 advises
the lawyer to be courteous to opposing counsel and to “accede to reasonable
requests . . . which do not prejudice the rights of his client,” and to “follow
local customs of courtesy or practice” or give notice of an intention not to.103
Farther back along this provision’s family tree lie the 1963 ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics. Canon 5 limits the defender of the criminally accused
to “all fair and honorable means.”104 The Canon goes on to condemn “the
suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses” by the prosecutor.105 Canon
15 states that a lawyer does not have “the duty . . . to do whatever may enable
him to succeed in winning his client’s cause,” but also insists that the lawyer
exert “entire devotion to the interest of the client.”106 Canon 17 distinguishes
between serving the client’s “ill feeling” toward the other side and pursuing the
client’s interests.107 The latter is commanded, the former should be avoided.108
Moreover, a lawyer should not attack opposing counsel’s character or
deportment.109 Canon 18 adds an injunction against ministering to the client’s
“malevolence or prejudices” and calls upon the lawyer to treat “adverse
witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration.”110 Canon 22 calls
upon the lawyer in court to act “with candor and fairness,” but this Canon is
generally concerned with truthfulness and respect for applicable law in the
presentation of legal argument or evidence.111 More informative is Canon 24,
which relates to “the incidents of the trial.”112 It calls for consideration of the
other side’s convenience when it does not “[work] substantial prejudice to the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at EC 7-9.
Id. at EC 7-10.
Id. at EC 7-9.
Id. at EC 7-10.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1983).
ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (1963).
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
See id.
ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 17 (1963).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 24.
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rights of the client,” including refusing to accept a continuance “when no harm
will result from a trial at a different time.”113
These comments, ECs, and canons point in two directions. In one
direction lies the enthusiastic furtherance of the client’s goals subject only to
the client’s informed decision as to tactics and objectives, rendering Comment
1 to Rule 1.3 meaningless. In the other direction lies what seems to be a
reference to the current rules of etiquette governing deportment in those social
contexts (in court, responding to discovery requests, negotiating, etc.) in which
the attorney finds herself the course of the representation. Yet, the Canons and
the ECs seem always to return to the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation
and seem to limit acts of consideration to acts that do not make much of a
difference to the client’s ultimate success; acts of inexpensive consideration for
others. If one wanted to draw a map showing the resulting tendency of the
applicable rules of conduct as set forth in the Canons, the Code, and the black
letter Rules, the resultant always points in the direction of achieving success
for the client, leaving the reference to consideration for others and etiquette to
those situations in which the client’s ultimate victory is not prejudiced.
If harsh tactics are more likely than soft tactics to gain a good result at less
cost, may the lawyer choose the latter over the former without seeking the
client’s informed approval or despite the client’s refusal to consent? If the
answer is “no,” then what is the point of the phrase holding the lawyer not to
be bound to “press for every advantage that might be realized for a client?”
Yet, the answer seems to be “no” in all cases in which the choice of tactic can
make a difference between success and failure. The phrase in question then is
simply a recommendation against unnecessary roughness.
There is one more place to look for some content in the statement in
Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.3—the customs of the community in which the
lawyer works.114 The lawyer must work for clients who have their own ideas
of their goals and what is permitted in the pursuit of those goals, trumping the
less aggressive measures that the lawyer ordinarily would favor. A lawyer
desiring to maintain a functioning and profitable relationship with a client will
be influenced by that client’s ideas and attitudes regarding the reasonableness
and rightness of harsh measures in the pursuit of the client’s ends. The lawyer
must work in a particular community of lawyers and judges, and that
community may have a normative substructure that simply rejects particular
tactics, however necessary they might be in the pursuit of success for the

113. Id. at 24.
114. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1983) (“He should follow local
customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention
not to do so.”).
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client.115 Perhaps the puzzling phrase in Comment 1 of Model Rule 1.3 is
there to allow the lawyer to conform to the customs of the community in which
she functions,116 for the protection of her reputation and in furtherance of her
ability to represent others, even though such conduct might prejudice the
interests of the relevant client.

115. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WISC. L.
REV. 1529, 1544–49 (1984); W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods of Enhancing the
Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV 967, 979 (2003).
116. By “community” I include, among other things, a group of attorneys with whom the
attorney in question is a “repeat player,” and the courts or administrative tribunals before which
the attorney in question appears with some frequency. This conflict between the lawyer’s need to
conform to “local” custom and the zealous pursuit of the client’s interests is one of several
unavoidable conflicts of interest in the practice of law that necessarily compromises the duty of
loyalty. See Dennis J. Tuchler, Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest and the Duty of Loyalty, 44 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1025 (2000).
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